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COMMENTARY
THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES IN A CHANGING POLITICAL
CLIMATE
KAREL VAN HULLE*
The cult of national sovereignty has become mankind's major
religion. The intensity of worship of the ideal of the national state
is, of course, no evidence that national sovereignty provides a
satisfactory basis for the political organization of mankind.. . .
The truth is very opposite. . . . It seems fairly safe to forecast
that, if the human race survives, it will have abandoned the ideal
and the practice of national sovereignty.
Arnold Toynbee (The Reluctant Death of Sovereignty)
The European Communities share with the rest of the world a
multitude of serious economic problems. With the entry of the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, the Communities consti-
tute one of the world's largest economic units with a total popula-
tion of more than 253 million inhabitants. However, much of the
enthusiasm surrounding the foundation of the European Commun-
ities has disappeared, and serious problems threaten its very exist-
ence. Agreements among the nine member nations' have become
difficult to reach. In an era requiring prompt and effective
decision-making, the presently inadequate decision-making pro-
cess threatens the very purpose of the European Communities.
This commentary will explore some of the legal problems which
have fostered the present difficulties. A complete overview of the
institutional structure of the European Communities would be be-
yond the scope of this article. 2 However, some comment will be
made regarding the principle institutions of the Communities,
* lic. iuris, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.
1. Since January 1, 1973, the member states of the European Communities are: Bel-
gium, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom.
2. For a survey of the Community institutions, see generally, E. NoEL, HOW THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S INSTITUTIONS WORK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ToPics 39 (Lux-
embourg 1973).
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namely, the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European
Parliament and the European Court of Justice.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
In 1951 Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman proposed to place
the coal and steel industries of Germany and France under a cen-
tralized authority. The result was the European Coal and Steel
Community (hereinafter referred to as the ECSC).3 In compari-
son to other international organizations, the institutional structure
of the ECSC was unique.
Since it was realized that traditional treaty principles would be
insufficient to accomplish the task, a new structure was created to
insure that community interest would overcome national interest.,
Four institutions were established: the High Authority, having ex-
clusive rule-making power and composed of independent men ap-
pointed with the unanimous consent of all the member national
governments; the Council of Ministers, composed of ministers of
the respective national governments; the Assembly, entrusted with
consulting responsibilities and composed of delegates designated
by each national parliament; and the Court of Justice, designed to
insure the observation of the law in the'interpretation and applica-
tion of the treaty.
The uniqueness of this institutional structure rested in the pow-
ers assigned to its components.5 A supranational body, the High
Authority, could make decisions which were binding upon the
member states and upon individuals without interference by the
national parliaments. The national interests were still protected,
however, by requiring the consent of the Council of Ministers for
many decisions of the High Authority. In theory, the system was
viable. In practice, it soon became clear that any action by the
High Authority was impossible if opposed by the member states
represented in the Council.
3. Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Paris, April 18, 1951.
When the United Kingdom joined the European Communities, an English translation of
the original Community treaties was made by an ad hoc committee. The text was annexed
to the Act of Accession, the provisions of which form an integral part of the Treaty of
Accession. Article 2 of the Treaty of Accession and Article 160 of the Act of Accession
provide that the English texts are authentic under the same conditions as the original texts
of the treaties. For a critical study of the English text of the treaties, see Bowyer, Englishing
Community Law, 9 COMM. MKT. L. REV' 439 (1972).
4. Thompson, The Institutional Structure of the EEC, 111 SOL. J. 226 (1967).
5. Mogan, Political Representation and European Integration, 1970 INTEGRATION 293.
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In 1957 the European Economic Community' (hereinafter re-
ferred to as EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community7
(hereinafter referred to as Eurotom) were created. Each Com-
munity was given an institutional structure similar to the one of
the ECSC. But under the EEC and the Eurotom Treaties, the High
Authority was now called the Commission; and milike the ECSC
Treaty, in which the rule-making power was vested exclusively in
the High Authority, the power was shared by the Commission and
the Council of Ministers. Most important decisions were to be
made by the Council. This marked an evolution from the ECSC
structure, in that the new organizations admitted the superior in-
fluence of the independent states.
In each Community, the responsibility of the Commission was
to administer the treaty and to prepare proposals for future action
in the Council. By granting the exclusive right of proposal to the
independent Commission and by requiring a Commission proposal
for most Council decisions, the treaties intended to promote Com-
munity interests." In this way, the treaties established a balance of
power between the Community interest represented by the Com-
mission and the interests of the member states represented by the
Council.9
With the creation of the EEC and Eurotom there existed in
Europe three Communities, with two Commissions and one High
Authority, three Councils of Ministers, one Court of Justice, and
a single Assembly common to the three Communities. With each
6. A treaty established the European Economic Community in Rome on March 25,
1957. The EEC is often called the "Common Market." The establishment of a common
market, however, is only one purpose of the EEC treaty. A common market reaches further
than a custom union. In a custom union, all customs, duties and other restrictive regulations
of commerce between the member states must be eliminated and a common outer tariff is
substituted for the national custom tariffs previously applicable to trades with third coun-
tries. A common market in addition requires that all barriers of trade between member
countries are abolished and that the conditions of competition are the same in each country.
See also, Waelbroek, Recent Developments and Future Prospects of the Common Market,
I GA. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 1 (1970).
7. Treaty establizhing the European Atomic Energy Community, Rome, March 25,
1957.
8. Nallstein, The EEC Commission: A New Factor in International Life, 14 INT'L. &
COMp. L.Q. 730 (1965).
9. The Council and the Commission are assisted by the Economic and Social Commit-
tee (144 members) for EEC and Euratom matters and the Consultative Committee (81
members) for ECSC matters. Both committees consist of representatives of various sectors
of economic and social life, e.g., trade associations, unions and farmers. On many subjects,
they have to be consulted before a decision can be taken.
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institution having distinct powers and procedures, conflict was in-
evitable. Furthermore, certain matters such as transportation, en-
ergy, and trade regulation fell within the concern of all three Com-
munities.
With the Treaty of Brussels" in 1965, the executives [High Au-
thority, two Commissions, three Councils] of the three Communi-
ties were merged in an attempt to bring order to the chaos. A
uniform institutional structure was established for the three Com-
munities, the single commission and the single council exercising
all the powers and responsibilities formerly vested in their respec-
tive predecessors."
Since then, significant changes have occurred in the Community
decision-making process and in the relationship between the Com-
munity institutions. The economic integration provided by the
Community treaties was intended to result in a further political
integration, but uprising national interests have caused the Euro-
pean Communities to be in "a situation of permanent crisis.' 12
As will be shown in this article, this situation of permanent crisis
is clearly reflected in the institutional evolution of the Communi-
ties. The first section of this article will examine more closely how
the delicate power balance between the Commission and the Coun-
cil has been tipped from the Commission back to the Council and
the national capitals. Second, the evolution of the relationship
between the European Parliament and the Commission will be
explored. Third, the examination of two cases will show the influ-
ence of the European Court of Justice on the relationship between
the Council and the Commission. Finally, the article will explore
how the implementation of the decisions of the 1974 European
summit in Paiis may bring some relief from the institutional crisis
in the European Communities.
II. THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
An essential characteristic of the decision-making process in the
European Communities is the so-called "dialogue" between the
10. Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission, Brussels, April 8,
1965. [Hereinafter cited as Merger treaty.]
!1. This means, for instance, that the Commission acting under the ECSC treaty as the
former High Authority has more power than acting as Commission under the EEC and
Euratom treaties.
12. Lagrange, The Court of Justice as a Factor in European Integration, 15 AM. J.
COMp. L. 709 (1966-67).
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Commission, an independent body whose task it is to define and
uphold the general Community interest, and the Council in which
the representatives of the member governments give expression to
their own national interests.
The Commission has not only executive and administrative func-
tions arising from its responsibility for insuring that the treaty
provisions and the decisions taken by the Community institutions
are correctly applied, but also the Commission has an independent
power of decision, and by exercising its right of proposal sets in
motion the law-making activity of the Council.13
On the -ther hand, the Council representing the governments of
the member states is more than an intergovernmental conference
of national ministers. The Council, as a Community institution,
must act both in the general interest of the Community and in
accord with the provisions and procedures instituted by the treat-
ies. 4
The treaties have established a delicate balance of power be-
tween the Council and the Commission, each being necessary and
fulfilling its own role in the decision-making process. However, if
a dialogue is to have meaning and be productive, the Council and
the Commission must be on equal footing. 5 The fact that Council
and Commission must be equal partners in the execution of their
respective functions is the basis of profound disagreement among
the member states. Unlike the ECSC treaty, the later Rome treat-
ies do not expressly state the supranational character of the Com-
mission." Furthermore, the Rome treaties use the neutral term
"Commission" rather than the stronger term "High Authority."
Thus, some member states have concluded that the Commission
is not an equal partner of the Council, and its task is merely to
assist the Council in making decisions. These member states have
argued that the Commission could not act independently without
the unanimous consent of the member states and would have no
political role to play.
This misunderstanding of the role of the Commission culmi-
nated in an institutional crisis in 1965 when the Commission, pur-
13. Article 155 EEC treaty; Article 124 Euratom treaty.
14. Article 4 and 145 EEC treaty; Article 3 and 155 Euratom treaty.
15. Hallstein, supra note 8, at 730.
16. Article 10 of the Merger treaty now only stresses the independent character of the
Commission as a necessary condition to protect the Commission's independent right of
proposal.
1975]
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suant to Article 201 of the EEC treaty, proposed to replace the
financial contributions of the member states with a system of its
own Community resources to finance the Common Agricultural
Policy. France reacted very strongly, 7 as the Commission's pro-
posal implied an extension of the powers of the European Parlia-
ment, and ultimately resolved to withdraw its permanent repre-
sentative to the Communities and to cease participation in any
Council meetings. France took this opportunity to offer its objec-
tions to the supranational system of the Community in a series of
ten complaints drawn up against the Commission, which France
asserted had gained too much influence and prestige and acted too
independently. The crisis was resolved by the Luxembourg Agree-
ment of January 28, 1966. The Foreign Ministers of the six mem-
ber states decided that the Commission, before adopting any par-
ticularly important proposal, would first consult the member gov-
ernments through the Committee of Permanent Representatives,
and that no proposals or other official acts of the Commission
would be made public until the member governments had formal
notice of such proposals or other official acts and would be in
possession of the texts. In addition, to diminish the Commission's
prestige outside the Community, the six also agreed to the French
request that the credentials of heads of missions of non-member
states accredited by the Community would have to be submitted
to both the President of the Council and the President of the Com-
mission.' 8 In this way it was made clear that the Commission was
not a kind of European government. Although these arrangements
were certainly the expression of a particular conception of the role
of the Commission, they did not directly affect the "dialogue"
between Council and Commission.
17. By decision of April 21, 1970, it was decided that from January 1, 1975, the budget
of the Communities would be financed entirely from the Communities' own resources
(Common Customs tariff, agricultural levies and a percentage of the value added tax),
irrespective of other revenues. This necessarily implied an increase of the budgetary powers
of the European Parliament as the Community budget escapes the control of the national
parliaments. In order to extend the powers of the European Parliament an amendment of
the treaties was required. This was done by the Treaty of Luxembourg of April 22, 1970.
On request by the European Parliament the Foreign Ministers of the nine member states
agreed on December 3, 1974 to extend once more the budgetary powers of the European
Parliament by giving it the right to reject the entire budget proposed by the Commission
and the Council.
18. Before the Luxembourg Agreement the credentials were submitted only to the
President of the Commission. See also, Thompson, The European Economic Community
After the 1965 Crisis, 16 INrr'L. & COMP. L.Q. 2 (1967).
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Another clause of the Luxembourg Agreement, however, had a
disastrous effect on the decision-making process within the Com-
munities. The EEC and Eurotom treaties state that, unless other-
wise provided by the treaty, the Council must act by a majority of
its members. 9 The provisions respecting majority voting in the
Council are of enormous importance: they guarantee the smooth
working of the decision-making process since no member state can
invoke the right of veto to block a decision. But majority voting
in a supranational organization also requires a certain degree of
maturity on the part of the organization and its member states. In
a system of majority voting a member state can be outvoted and
can be required to implement a decision it does not favor. As a
result of the 1965 crisis, the six agreed in Luxembourg that major-
ity voting would not be used in the Council in all cases where the
"vital national interests" of one or more partners were at stake.
The Agreement, which the Commission never recognized, resulted
in a complete distortion of the decision-making process in the
European Communities. Unanimous voting became the rule, and
nothing remained of the delicate balance of power established by
the treaties.2 1
The important clause in the "dialogue" between Commission
and Council, requiring unanimity by the Council in order to adopt
amendments to a proposal of the Commission, became nearly
meaningless. 2' This provision was intended to protect the Commis-
sion's right of proposal. When the Council wanted to overrule the
Commission's proposal, the treaties required a unanimous vote,
and the Commission could alter its original proposal as long as the
Council had not acted upon it. On the other hand, when in defiance
of the treaties, all decisions in the Council are taken unanimously,
the guarantee that the Community interest will prevail over the
national interests of the member states no longer exists.
While the Commission originally intended its proposals to repre-
sent the Community interest, it has now become more important
to define them in terms of acceptability for the Council. Hence, the
Commission became more "realistic," and the quality of its pro-
posals to the Council has diminished accordingly.
Before submission to the Council, each proposal is discussed in
19. Article 148(1) EEC treaty; Article 118(1) Euratom treaty.
20. Berg, Zur Leistungsfahigheit der "Gemeinschaftsmethode" der Europaischen
Gemeinschaften, 1971 INTEGRATION 205.
21. Article 149 EEC treaty; Article 119 Euratom treaty.
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various committees and sub-committees, most important of which
is the Committee of Permanent Representatives. This committee,
consisting of the permanent representatives (ambassadors) of the
member states to the Communities, was not originally provided for
by the Rome treaties. The Treaty of Brussels of 1965 (Merger
Treaty) confirmed the Committee's existence and gave it the re-
sponsibility of preparing the deliberations of the Council.22 This
Committee acts as a filter though which most of the Commission
proposals pass before reaching the ministers in the Council. A
committee of this kind is necessary to prepare the deliberations of
the Council, so as not to overburden that body. The tendency,
however, among the permanent representatives is to come to a
unanimous agreement, thus strengthening the compromise-
character of the Commission proposals.2 Once submitted to the
Council, yet another compromise is necessary to obtain unanimity.
This results in a procedure which is characterized by package-deals
and marathon sessions, characteristics which are certainly not con-
ducive to efficient decision-making.24 With the enlargement of the
Communities by the entry of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and
Denmark in 1973, unanimous voting in the Council became very
difficult. The result has been a permanent crisis and apparent para-
lysis of the decision-making process.2s With the evolution of this
condition, the necessity of eliminating unanimous voting in favor
of the more mature system of majority decision making in the
Council has been seen as an absolute prerequisite for any further
progress in European integration.
III. POLITICAL CONTROL BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT OVER
THE COMMISSION
If one considers legislative power and the direct election of its
members as a necessary requirement for a parliament, the Euro-
22. Article 4 of the Merger treaty: "A Committee consisting of the Permanent Repre-
sentatives of the Member States shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council
and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council."
23. FALLSTEIN, DER UNVOLLENDETE BUNDESSTAAT. EUROPXISCHE ERFAHRUNGEN AND
ERKENNTNISSE 65 (D Iseldorf/Wein 1969).
24. Berg, supra note 20, at 211. Good examples of this "Marathon" procedure are the
yearly sessions of the Council of Ministers where agricultural prices for the coming year
are determined. These meetings usually last about 24 hours and even then a unanimous
decision is only possible when a dissenting state is guaranteed special future consideration
in an area of particular interest to it.
25. F. ALTING VON GEUSAu, BEYOND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 59 (Leiden 1969).
[Vol. 58
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pean Parliament 6 cannot be considered a true parliament. The
European Parliament has only a consultative function. It exercises
the advisory and supervisory powers conferred upon it by the treat-
ies.2Y Each country is entitled to a specified number of seats and
votes, with appointment powers for these positions vested in the
national parliaments. 28 The responsibility of its delegates, however,
is dualistic, since "the representation of the peoples of the States
brought together in the Community" gives them a mandate to
ensure the common as well as the national interest of each member
state considered separately. 29 At the same time, the delegates oc-
cupy a position of independent judgment. They are not instructed
by their national parliaments or governments and are not account-
able to any external authority for their speeches and votes.3"
In theory, the Euorpean Parliament exercises political control
over the Commission. In actuality, its chief role is that of influenc-
ing the dialogue between Commission initiative and Council ap-
proval .3 Parliament and Commission have shown a close partner-
ship in 'defending the common European interest against the insur-
gent national interests in the Council.
The trend in The Council of requiring a unanimous vote in all
cases, when coupled with a'certain passiveness on the part of the
Commission, has resulted in some changes in this intimate collabo-
ration between the Commission and the European Parliament.
On November 16, 1972, a French socialist representative, Mr.
Spenale, introduced in the European Parliament a motion to cen-
sure the Commission, because he believed that the Commission
had failed to timely present a proposal for increasing the Parlia-
ment's budgetary powers, pursuant to a declaration of the Council
26. The treaties use the term "Assembly." On March 20, 1962, the Assembly gave itself
the name "European Parliament," which, with the longtime exception of the French, has
come into common usage.
27. Article 137 EEC treaty; Article 20 ECSC treaty; Article 107 Euratom treaty: "The
Assembly which shall consist of representatives of the peoples of the States brought together
in the Community, shall exercise the advisory and supervisory powers which are conferred
upon it by this Treaty."
28. Article 138 EEC treaty; Article 21 ECSC treaty; Article 108 Euratom treaty. The
number of delegates for each country is as follows: Germany, France, Italy and the United
Kingdom: 36; Belgium and the Netherlands: 14; Denmark and Ireland: 10; Luxembourg:
6.
29. Article 137 EEC treaty; Article 20 ECSC treaty; Article 108 Euratom treaty.
30. Article 9 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Com-
munities, Brussels, April 8, 1965; Hogan, supra note 5, at 292.
31. Hogan, supra note 5, at 293.
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made April 12, 1970. Although Mr. Spenale withdrew his motion,
probably because he expected that the motion would not receive
the required number of votes, this incident clearly shows the inten-
tion of the European Parliament to follow its own course and, if
necessary, to do so independently of the other institutions.32 It is,
however, very doubtful that the execution of a motion of censure
by the Parliament against the Commission would bring about a
solution to the institutional problems in the European Communi-
ties.
A motion of censure levied against the Commission requires a
two-thirds majority of all votes cast. As the authors of the treaties
considered the possibility of a motion of censure as something very
exceptional, and at the same time as a possible threat to the life
of the Community, they not only required that it be passed by a
large majority of votes, but also stated that the vote should be
open. In addition, the Assembly must wait at least three days after
the motion has been tabled before it can vote thereon. As a result
of a successful motion of censure, the Commission has to resign
as a body.3
Since the treaties do not distinguish between the procedure for
appointment of the members of the Commission after the normal
finishing of their term and after a successful motion of censure,
nothing can prevent the national governments from reappointing
the same Commission.34 This would make the parliamentary con-
trol over the Commission nearly meaningless. The Parliament, for
its part, could not immediately vote a new motion of censure
against the same reappointed Commission because the treaties
state that the motion of censure has to be based on "the activities
of the Commission." Even a reappointment of the same Commis-
sion would constitute a "new" body, and the Parliament would
have to wait until this "new" body had acted again before it could
32. Bieber, Das Parlamentarische Misstrauensvotum in den Europtischen
Gemeinschafien, 1973 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [N.J.W.] 406.
33. Article 144 EEC treaty; Article 24 ECSC treaty; Article 114 Euratom treaty:
If a motion of censure on the activities of the Commission is tabled before it, the
Assembly shall not vote thereon until at least three days after the motion has been
tabled and only by open vote. If the motion of censure is carried by a two-thirds
majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of the members of the Assembly,
the members of the Commission shall resign as a body.
34. Article I I merger treaty: "The members of the Commission shall be appointed by
common accord of the Governments of the Member States. Their term of office shall be
four years. It shall be renewable."
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raise another motion of censure.3 In fact, a motion of censure
against the Commission does not mean very much. The central
decision-making institution in the Communities is the Council, and
as long as there is no direct political control over the Council, a
motion of censure against the Commission cannot change much.
However, the Council of Ministers could not be brought under
the control of the European Parliament without a power to censure
it from office, or to dismiss its members. This would mean, how-
ever, a competence to remove ministers who are responsible to
their own national parliaments, and it is clear that a minister can
be responsible to only one parliament. Thereofore, the Council of
Ministers, representing the national governments, cannot be re-
sponsible to the European Parliament without giving an autono-
mous governing power to the European Community. A suprana-
tional parliament cannot be "supreme" if the disposition of issues
within its purview depends, in the final analysis, upon the national
governments.3 1
On the other hand, the extension of the powers of the European
Parliament by giving it some legislative powers, combined with the
direct election of its members by the peoples constituting the Euro-
pean Communities, would not only add to the democratic charac-
ter of the Communities but would also provide the Parliament with
a sort of direct control over the Council, as it could refuse its
collaboration for decisions it considers not to be in the European
interest.
IV. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AS A MODERATOR
BETWEEN COMMISSION AND COUNCIL
It is remarkable that since the creation of the European Com-
munities only two disputes between the Council and the Commi-
sion were brought before the Court. In both cases the Commision
took the initiative, basing its action against the Council on Article
173 of the EEC treaty. According to this article, a member state,
the Council, or the Commission can bring an action before the
Court of Justice for review of the legality of acts of the Council
and the Commission, other than recommendations or opinions.
The action has to be based on grounds of lack of competence,
35. Bieber, supra note 32, at 406.
36. Hogan, supra note 5, at 293-95; Schwed, Quelques considerations sur l'avenir des
institutions des Communautes Europeennes, 1972 REvUE DU MARCHE COMMUN [R.M.C.]
214.
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infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement
of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or
misuse of powers. If the action is well founded, the Court will
declare the act concerned to be void.37
On May 19, 1970, the Commission initiated an action before the
European Court of Justice seeking annulment of the "Council's
deliberations" of March 20 on the negotiation and conclusion of a
revised European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA). As the
revision of the ERTA related to the same subject matter as Council
Regulation No. 543/69, adopted in March, 1969, and a few sub-
stantive rules laid down in the revised ERTA differed from the
corresponding provisions of the Regulation, the Commission
argued that in matters falling within the substantive scope of Regu-
lation No. 543/69, authority to enter into international agreements
had passed from the member states to the Community. Therefore,
the Council's "decision" that the member states would conduct the
negotiations and conclude the ERTA constituted a violation of the
rights of the Community and deprived the Commission of the
possibility of carrying out the tasks which Article 228 of the EEC
treaty assigns to it in the field of treaty-making. 8
In a remarkable judgment of March 31, 1971, the Court sus-
tained the Commission's position but, on the merits, ruled in favor
of the Council.3 9
The position of the two institutions opposing each other in this
legal dispute clearly reflected the interests which each had a duty
to safeguard. The Commission represented the interests of the
Community and. its institutions, claiming that the principle of at-
tributed (or enumerated) powers should not be applied with the
utmost strictness in the field of the Community's external relations
in an area with so many international aspects as transportation.
The Council, on the other hand, clung to a narrow definition of the
Community's external powers and sought to protect the sover-
37. Article 174 EEC treaty.
38. Article 228 EEC treaty:
Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Com-
munity and one or more States or an international organization, such agreements
shall be negotiated by the Commission. Subject to the powers vested in the Commis-
sion in this field, such agreements shall be concluded by the Council, after consulting
the Assembly where required by this Treaty.
39. Case 22/70 (Commission v. Council) of March 31, 1971, 17 Recueil de la Jurisprud-
ence de la Cour [Recueil] 263 (1971).
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eignty of the member states in the foreign field from an allegedly
illegal limitation by the Community."
While the overwhelming majority of legal writers were in agree-
ment that the Community possessed only a treaty-making power
in the cases expressly provided for in the treaties," the Court ren-
dered a rather wide definition of cases where a grant of external
power can arise, offering the Commission more than it had bar-
gained for but at the same time finding in favor of the Council on
the merits because of the "particularities of the situation. '4
The second case, involving a lawsuit between the Council and the
Commission, came before the Court of Justice as a result of a
strike by the Community officials. In its judgment of June 5, 1973,
the Court declared void certain articles of the Council Regulations
of December, 1972, determining the remuneration of officials and
other servants of the Communities, and the Council Decisions of
March 20 and 21, 1972, on the new remuneration policy. 43 Here
again, the Court found in favor of the Commission in a potentially
explosive situation which could have had a disastrous effect on the
European Communities if the Court had upheld the Council deci-
sions.
These two cases are the only cases in which a legal conflict
between the Council and the Commission has been brought before
the European Court of Justice. The lack of case law on this subject
can be explained by the fact that the underlying problem in a
conflict of power between the Council and the Commission is
based on a conflict between national and Community law, the
Council representing the interest of the member states and the
40. Winter, Annotation on case 22/70, re ERTA: Commission v. Council, 8 COMM.
MKT. L. REV. 551 (1971).
41. See, inter alia, Pescatore, Les relations extkrieures des Communautes Europkennes,
103 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.], II, 27-
46, 81-94 (1962); J. RAUX, LES RELATIONS EXTRIEURES DE LA COMMUNAUT ECONOMIQUE
EUFOPtENNE 52-57 (Paris 1966).
42. Brinkhorst, Noot bij het AETR arrest, 1971 SocIAAL-ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING
[S.E.W.] 479; Collinson, The Foreign Relations Powers of the European Communities: A
Comment on Commission v. Council, 23 STAN. L. REV. 956 (1970-71); Ganshof Van der
Meersch, Less relations extkrieures de la CEE dans le domaine des politiques communes et
l'arr&t de la Cour de Justice du 31 Mars 1971, 1972 CHIERS DE DROIT EUROP9EN [C.D.E.]
157; Kovar, L'affaire de rAETR devant la CJCE -1 la competnce internationale de la
CEE, 1971 ANNUAIRE FRANrAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [A.F.D.I.] 408; Raux, La Cour
de Justice des Communautbs et les relations ext&rieures de la CEE, 1972 REVUE GgNtRALE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV9 [R.G.D.I.P.] 65; Sasse, Zur auswartigen Gewalt der
EWG, 1971 EUROPARECHT [EURI 226.
43. Case 30/72 (Commission v. Council) of June 5, 1973, 19 Recueil 250 (1973).
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Commission protecting the interest of the Community.
This appears clearly in the ERTA case where the conflict of
power between Council and Commission was only secondary to the
more important and broader question of the distribution of the
external powers between the Community and the member states.
Where the Court in two previous landmark decisions" ruled that
the creation and the functioning of the Communities had caused a
transfer of powers from the member states to the Community in
the internal sphere, the Court in the ERTA case decided that the
adoption of common rules by the Community, with a view to
implementing a common policy envisaged by the EEC treaty, had
divested the member states of their power to act externally in a way
which might affect these rules:
To the extent that such common rules come into being, the Com-
munity alone is in a position to assume and carry out contractual
obligations towards non-member States affecting the whole
sphere of application of the Community legal system.
One cannot therefore, in implementing the provisions of the
Treaty, separate the category of measures internal to the Com-
munity from that of the external relations."
The Court's judgment in this case has been heavily criticized."
The French Foreign Minister, in response to a question posed by
the French National Assembly, expressed the surprise of the
French government at the far-reaching ruling of the Court. The
French government, however, would continue its confidence in the
Court as long as it fulfilled the task the member states had con-
ferred upon it, that is, "to ensure the respect of the law in the
interpretation and application of the treaty of Rome."47
The ERTA case once more proves that the European Court of
Justice, even in such delicate situations as a legal conflict between
the Commission and the Council, does not hesitate to support the
44. Case 26/62 (Van Gend & Loos v. Tariefcommissie Amsterdam) of February 5,
1963, 9 Recueil 1 (1963); Case 6/64 (Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica) of July
15, 1964, 10 Recueil 1141 (1964).
45. Case 22/70 (Commission v. Council) of March 31, 1971, 17 Recueil 266 (1971).
46. Le Monde, April 27, 1971, at 19-20; Note, L'arret du 31 mars 1971, 1971 REvUE
DU MARCHE COMMUN [R.M.C.] 283-84.
47. R6ponse A Mr. Cous6 par le ministre francais des affaires &rang~res sur la
comp6tence de negotiation externe de la Communaut6 A la suite de l'arret 22/70 de la
CJCE, en date du 31 Mars 1971, 1971 ANNUAIRE FRAN;AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE
[A.F.D.I.] 1052.
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Community's point of view against uprising national interests in
the Council by broadly interpreting the Community law."
V. RECENT INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS: THE 1974 PARIS
SUMMIT MEETING
Although not provided for by the treaties, the problem caused
by the abuse of the unanimity rule in the Council made it necessary
to organize at regular times meetings of the heads of government
of the member states so as to break the deadlock in the Council
and to make major decisions for long-term Community develop-
ments. These so-called "summit" meetings raised several legal and
political questions.
As these meetings were not provided by the treaties, they could
hardly be considered Community "institutions." As a result, the
European Court of Justice was unable to evaluate the legality of
the decisions reached at these Summit meetings even when the
decisions violated treaty provisions. The Commission was not al-
lowed to take part in these meetings and thus could not exercise
its right of proposal. This could easily infringe on the rights of the
Commission as granted by the treaties, and the Commission often
saw itself faced with a fait accompli.
Political problems also resulted from the "summit" meetings.
Some considered the "summits" an escape from the supranational
procedures set forth in the treaties to a situation of intergovern-
mental negotiations. Another problem with the summit meetings
was that the decisions made during the meetings were often un-
timely or not implemented.
Because of the ineffectiveness of these summit meetings, it is no
wonder that when the French President, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing,
proposed a new summit meeting be held in Paris at the end of 1974,
not all member states agreed on the need for this summit.49 In
addition, the severe economic problems the political leaders of the
48. See generally, A. GREEN, POLITICAL INTEGRATION BY JURISPRUDENCE: THE WORK
OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL
INTEGRATION (Leiden 1969); Lagrange, The Court of Justice as a Factor in European
Integration, 15 AM. J. ComP. L. 709 (1967).
49. According to Article 2 of the Merger treaty, the office of president of the Council
of Ministers is held for a term of six months by each member in turn, in alphabetical order
of the member states. In the second half of 1974 the presidency of the Council was held by
France. Therefore, the French President acted as host for the European summit and repre-
sented his European partners at his meeting with the American President on Martinique,
in December, 1974.
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Community member states had to face in their respective countries
made a discussion of the institutional problems of the Community
of far less urgency. Nevertheless, when the European summit
opened in Paris on December 9, 1974, the institutional issue was
put on the agenda, and, remarkably, some major decisions con-
cerning the European institutions resulted.
To ameliorate the functioning of the Communities and aid polit-
ical cooperation, the nine member states decided in Paris on a six-
point program concerning the institutions:
1. The heads of government and their foreign ministers would
meet at least three times a year, once in Brussels and twice in other
capitals, as the newly named European Council. To avoid the deli-
cate question of the "permanent political secretariat" which
France wanted to establish in Paris, it was decided that the meet-
ings of the European Cuncil would be organized by the existing
secretariat of the Community. The creation of this European
Council meant the institutionalization of the European summits.
A similar institutional framework had already been proposed by
Mr. Fouchet in 1960 in his plan for a European Political Union, a
European confederation (l'Europe des Etats) in the way De Gaulle
wanted it.5o In 1962, the Benelux countries vigorously rejected this
"nationalistic" proposal. It is remarkable that the communique of
the Paris meeting expressly states that the creation of this Euro-
pean Council does not impair the provisions and procedures of the
treaties and the declarations of Luxembourg and Copenhagen on
political cooperation. The communique also stresses the role of the
Commission in the preparation of the meetings of the European
Council. It is not clear, however, whether this statement means
that the European Council should be considered as a Community
institution, and therefore must act in accordance with the princi-
ples set forth by the treaties and in the interest of the Community.
2. The nine member states also expressed a desire to adopt a
common position on foreign policy questions affecting the interests
of the Community. The president of the Council would act as the
spokesman for the nine member states and would provide for nec-
essary consultations prior to the meetings. The nine agreed that
closer collaboration with the European Parliament in matters of
political cooperation was necessary. This could, for instance, be
done by the members of Parliament questioning the president of
50. Seydoux, Le Plan Fouchet a-t-il une chance?, Le Monde, December 29, 1974, at 3'
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the Council on the activities in the field of political cooperation.
3. Paragraph six of the communiques contained the following
important provision:
In order to improve the functioning of the Council of Minis-
ters, they (the Government Heads) consider it necessary to re-
nounce the practice of making agreement on all questions condi-
tional on the unanimous consent of the member states, whatever
their respective position may be regarding the conclusions
reached in Luxembourg on January 28, 1966.51
Whether this will open the way for majority decisions in all cases
provided by the treaties remains uncertain. The official text of the
communique is vague enough to allow different interpretations. On
the other hand, it appears from comments on the Paris summit
that there was an understanding that no majority vote would ever
be taken on a matter in which a member country's vital interests
were threatened. 2 The term "vital interest" is of course very rela-
tive, and a broad interpretation could render it meaningless. It is
very doubtful, however, that a member state in a minority position
would implement a decision constituting a real threat to its "vital
national interests." As long as this exception hangs like a sword
of Damocles over decision-making in the Council, no real progress
can be expected.
4. The nine member states recognized the importance of imme-
diate direct elections for the European Parliament. They recom-
mended that the Council decide in 1976 on the proposals made by
the European Parliament on the question of direct elections, ac-
cording to Article 138(3) of the EEC treaty. 3 Direct elections
could take place in or after 1978. The powers of the European
Parliament would be enlarged by giving the European Parliament
more powers in the decision-making process. Here again, the text
51. After the institutional crisis of 1965, the then six member states agreed in Luxem-
bourg that majority rule, provided by the treaties, would not be used in cases where it would
threaten the "vital national interests" of a member state.
52. The Daily Telegraph, December 12, 1974, at 4, col. 3; Le Monde, December 11,
1974, at 3, col. 4.
53. Article 138(3) EEC treaty:
The Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage
in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States.
The Council shall, acting unanimously, lay down the appropriate provisions
which it shall recommend to Member States for adoption in accordance with their
respective constitutional requirements.
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of the communique is vague and diplomatic enough to allow differ-
ent interpretations. The heads of government clearly recognized
that it was undesirable and even impracticable to have direct elec-
tions for a parliament with inadequate powers.54
5. The nine member states also decided to give more powers
to the Commission, to develop new common policies, and to grant
the necessary powers to the Community institutions. Indeed, the
final realization of the economic and monetary union not only
requires new institutions but also the enlargement of the powers of
the existing Community institutions, especially the Commission.
6. In the broader context of European political integration, the
nine member states decided to establish a working group to create
a "uniform passport" for nationals of all member states and, even-
tually, a "passport union" that might issue a standard European
passport. The Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans, was asked
by his partners to submit to the heads of government before the
end of 1975 a report on the creation of a European Union. The
basis of this report would be documents prepared by the Commis-
sion, the European Parliament55 and the European Court of Jus-
tice. This report would also take into consideration opinions of the
national governments and of action groups representing public
opinion inside the Community.
IV. CONCLUSION
The implementation of the decisions of the Paris summit will
certainly help to improve the relationship between the Community
institutions. Much will depend, however, on the political will of the
member states. There are some signs that the thunderclouds which
covered the political climate in the Communities during the past
few years are slowly clearing up. On the other hand, the widening
gap between the relatively strong economies of some member
states, especially Germany and the Benelux countries, and the
weakness in other nations, especially Britain, Denmark, and Italy,
makes a stronger political and economic integration of the nine
54. On the matter of direct elections to the European Parliament, there were two
reservations. The Danish delegation could not assure they would hold direct elections in
1978. The British Prime Minister declared that Britain's decision on the matter of direct
elections would depend on the results of the renegotiation of Britain's terms of membership
in the European Communities.
55. The commission for political affairs of the European Parliament has already drafted
a proposal outlining the institutional changes required for a transition of the European
Communities into a European Political Union: Eur. ParI. Doc. 34.134, January 8, 1974.
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member states very difficult. This might well result in a stronger
united Europe of six or seven instead of nine countries.
The problem is that the treaties do not contain a provision for a
member country to withdraw from the Community. With respect
to the original member states of the European Communities, it is
clear that their economies are now so closely linked that it would
certainly be against the economic interests of any member to with-
draw. This became clear in 1965 when the French government
boycotted the Community institutions and was subseqsently put
under strong pressure from financial and industrial circles inside
France not to withdraw from the Community or block its progess.
But the situation is different for the new members of the Commun-
ities, especially the United Kingdom. Although the treaties do not
contain any express condition for membership of the European
Communities, except that it must be a European state, it is gener-
ally accepted that becoming a member of the Communities implies
the acceptance of the underlying political aims of the Communi-
ties, such as the further political integration of its members.
When one considers the attitude of the United Kingdom since it
became a member of the Communities in 1973, one really wonders
whether it joined the Communities for other than purely economic
reasons. It is probable that given the current economic situation
in Britain, membership in the Communities is a necessary condi-
tion for this country to survive, but the continued attempt by any
member of the European Communities to block the further politi-
cal integration of the member states by boycotting every decision
on the matter cannot be accepted.
Therefore, it is necessary to have a provision in the treaties
allowing a member state to withdraw from the Communities. In
the actual legal situation, withdrawal would certainly constitute a
breach of an international obligation, unless, perhaps, justified by
exceptional circumstances. This, however, causes very difficult
problems in terms of damages and compensation for financial and
other benefits received. 6
In any case, a provision allowing a member to withdraw could
56. Some people have already argued that if the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson,
would try to take Britain out of the Communities, they would bring him before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. Whether this is legally possible is very doubtful, although this
suggestion clearly reflects the reactions resulting from the British attitude toward its Com-
munity membership. See also, White, The Effect of the Common Market on British Law,
59 A.B.A.J. 620 (1973).
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also bring a solution for the problem of unanimous voting in the
Council. If a member state considers every Council decision as a
possible threat to its vital national interests, it must have the right
to withdraw. If one does not accept the supranational structure of
the Communities, which implies majority decisions, there is only
one answer-withdrawal. But the recognition of the right of with-
drawal in the treaties also requires the member states to finally
give a clear answer on the question of how they envision the future
of a united Europe. If some member states do not agree with the
then clearly expressed wish of the majority, they not only have the
right but alsb the duty to withdraw and to establish, if they wish,
a new relationship with their former partners who decided to pro-
ceed further on the way toward a European political integration.
